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I.

Introduction
At the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000, the European Union has set itself the

strategic goal to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world. The Lisbon Council also called for building up a supportive general framework
for economic activity in the EU. The Commission of the European Communities1 responded
to this appeal by presenting a comprehensive tax strategy for the Internal Market: The adoption of a common consolidated corporate tax base and the implementation of formulary apportionment for EU multinational enterprises.2 The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate
the EU tax reform proposal by scrutinizing its most important advantages and downsides and
by pointing out additional issues of the strategy that should be addressed in the future. The
reader shall be enabled to form her own educated view on one of today’s most ambitious
political projects in the European Union.
My analysis begins with a description of the status quo of corporate taxation in the European Union and a thorough assessment of its major disadvantages from a European perspective. Next, I explain the key features and the current progress of the EU Commission’s reform proposal and I discuss whether the proposed system can effectively address the identified problems of cross-border taxation. Considering possible disadvantages and remaining

1

In the following informally referred to as “The EU Commission” or “The Commission”.

2

Commission of the European Communities, Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles: A strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax base for their EU-wide Activities, COM
(2001) 582 final.
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uncertainties of the proposal, I focus particularly on the problem of political feasibility and
try to offer additional thoughts on the issue. Lastly, I elaborate on a future EU formulary
apportionment system by providing insights into the history and current practices of US state
corporate income taxation, before I conclude by summarizing my personal assessment of the
proposal.

II.

Major Problems of Corporate Taxation in the EU
While important steps have been taken in other European policy areas during the last

decades, little has changed with regard to the taxation of EU-wide operating companies and
the Member States essentially operate the same company tax systems as they did before the
set-up of the Internal Market. Thus, EU businesses today are confronted with a single economic zone in which 27 different taxation systems and tax rates apply.3
This is particularly cumbersome for multinational enterprises (“MNE”) which generally
operate outside their home markets through subsidiaries. These subsidiaries must report their

3

For an overview of the statutory corporate income tax rates in the Member States of 2001 see Peter Birch
Sørensen, Company Tax Reform in the European Union, 2003, page 24. Data from 1999 show that the effective tax rates of subsidiaries located in different host countries can vary for more than 30 percentage points.
Likewise, the effective tax rates for subsidiaries operating in a given country can also vary for more than 30
percentage points depending on where their parent company is located, see Commission of the European Communities, Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles: A strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax base for their EU-wide Activities, COM (2001) 582 final, Annex: Executive Summary
of the Commission Services Study on “Company Taxation in the Internal Market”, page 7.
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income and are taxed according to the laws of the countries in which they are located. Thus,
under the current system a MNE has to calculate a separate tax base in each Member State
where one of its subsidiaries is located. The rule for the calculation of these individual tax
bases is that each entity within the company’s group has to be treated like an independent
entity operating at “arm’s length” from its affiliates and its parent company. In order to accomplish this, the MRE is obliged to set the prices for internal transfers among controlled
entities in the same manner that enterprises operating independently set prices on the market.
Hence, the arm’s length principle creates the mere fiction that affiliated companies conduct
business with each other at general market conditions rather than at favourable conditions in
the interest of the group as a whole. A MNE currently has to establish these so called transfer
prices for every cross-border transfer of goods, property, services, loans, and leases with its
related affiliates in other Member States of the European Union and has to use these prices to
calculate the respective taxable income associated with an entity.
This traditional method of separate entity accounting with the arm’s length principle pays
tribute to the separate legal status of affiliates within a multinational enterprise and has been
employed in Europe for about a hundred years. But however reasonable its adoption might
have been in the past, it is questionable whether the concept can live up to the standards and
realities of the European Union in the 21st century. During the last decades, technological
innovation and especially the development of e-commerce have enhanced the mobility of
certain forms of economic activity as well as the mobility of capital. Businesses in the European Union increasingly operate in more than one Member State and there are more interna4

tional mergers and acquisitions than ever before. However, evidence suggests that the current system of corporate taxation impedes the free movement of capital in this changing environment. This would contravene the EC Treaty that aims at ensuring the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital in the Internal Market and at removing economic and
commercial barriers between the Member States. As the executive branch of the European
Union, the EU Commission is responsible for upholding the Union's treaties and for initialising the legislative measures necessary to address obstacles to cross-border economic activity.
In the following, I will adopt the Commission’s perspective in analysing the major disadvantages of the status quo of corporate taxation in the European Union.
First, the existence of a multitude of different taxation systems generates a huge lack of
transparency and significant compliance costs for multinational enterprises. The specific
compliance costs can be huge and can impede a company’s cross-border business activity by
making it comparatively more costly. Under the current system of separate accounting, MNE
have to comply with different sets of rules for financial accounting and tax reporting in every
Member State in which they operate. There is no unified accounting standard in the European Union today and the variation in Member States tax bases is also significant. For example, the modus operandi for depreciation and the depreciation rates differ widely amongst
countries. Therefore, MNE have to employ accountants, lawyers, and tax consultants for
each jurisdiction in which they conduct business and bear the risk of failure of compliance.
However, the most pestering problems today seem to arise from the need to comply with
the arm’s length principle. According to a 2003 survey of Ernst & Young, 86 percent of
5

MNE parent company respondents and 93 percent of subsidiary respondents identified transfer pricing as the most important international tax matter they are currently dealing with.4
Businesses find it increasingly difficult to establish “correct” transfer prices and to meet the
growing demand for documentation of the price-setting process. The system of establishing
transfer prices in the European Union is indeed very complicated today and is often a source
of frustration both for MNEs and for tax authorities. One reason for the growing difficulties
that MNE face with regard to transfer pricing is that almost all Member States have been
significantly stepping up their enforcement efforts. As the volume of cross-border investment in the EU increases, the Member States seem to fear an increase in tax evasion and
fraud that threaten to erode their corporate tax bases. In fact, evidence suggests that MNE
indeed tend to shift income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. Bartelsman and
Beetsma5 for example have evaluated European data about the correlation of raising tax rates
and revenues. They find that revenues do not increase when countries raise their tax rates
because reported profits fall. Zodrow6 refers to numerous studies finding that after-tax profitability tends to be high in low-tax countries. And Grubert7 finds that subsidiaries of U.S.

4

See ERNST & YOUNG, Transfer Pricing 2003 Global Survey - Practices, Perceptions and Trends in 22
Countries Plus Tax Authority Approaches in 44 Countries, 2003.
5

Eric Bartelsman & Roel Beestma, Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in
OECD countries, 87 Journal of Public Economics Nr. 9-10, 2003, pages 2225-2252.
6

George R. Zodrow, Capital Mobility and Source-Based Taxation of Capital Income in Small Open
Economies, International Tax and Public Finance, 13, 2006, pages 269-294.
7

Harry Grubert, Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting, and the Choice of Location, 56 National Tax Journal Nr. 1, part 2, 2003 pages 221-242.
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multinational companies located in high or low tax areas that have a strong incentive to shift
income also have significantly larger volume of inter-company transactions. In combination,
these findings suggest that multinationals do take advantage of cross-border tax differentials
by shifting income through the means of tax-motivated and oftentimes manipulative transfer
pricing. For example, a subsidiary located in a low-tax country could sell items to the parent
company in a high-tax country at an inflated price, thus making the profits of the subsidiary
in the low-tax country look larger while the parents profit look smaller. Therefore, it is understandable that Member States – particularly those with high corporate tax rates – have
increased their efforts in enforcing transfer prices during the last decade and impose more
and more onerous documentation requirements. Along with the increase in compliance costs
for MNE comes an increase in administrative costs to the tax authorities due to complicated
administrative procedures like auditing the pricing procedures, settling disputes with companies and agreeing with other affected Member States on transfer prices on cross-border exchanges of services or other intangibles.
On the other hand, MNEs rightfully complain that the application of the various methods
for determining the "correct" transfer price for an intra-group transaction is complex and
costly. New technologies and business structures that imply more emphasis on intangible
goods and on intra-company services make it more and more difficult to identify comparable
“uncontrolled” transactions which are needed to establish the arm's length prices. Oftentimes
the transfer prices calculated for tax purposes do not serve any underlying commercial rationale at all any more. As a result, MNE face uncertainty as to whether their transfer prices
7

will be accepted by the tax administrations upon a subsequent audit. In addition, transfer
pricing methods and even OECD guidelines on transfer pricing are applied differently across
Member States. Thus, different jurisdictions might require different transfer prices to be applied to the same intra-company transaction. As a result, overlapping national tax bases create a real risk for double taxation whereas uncoordinated transfer pricing rules leave gaps in
the international tax base. Imagine for example that the tax administration of one Member
State examines a pricing, considers it to contravene its rules and unilaterally adjusts the price.
If this adjustment is not offset by a corresponding adjustment in the other Member State
concerned with the transaction, then the MNE will be taxed double. Unfortunately, this scenario is everything but rare. According to the Ernst & Young survey of 2003, an estimated
40 percent of all reported transfer pricing adjustments result in double taxation. Since many
business representatives consider the cost and time relating to the dispute settlement procedures to be prohibitively high, they often have to “accept” this kind of double taxation. I believe that the increased compliance costs and risks do not only impede, but might even deter
companies from engaging in cross-border economic activity, particularly small and medium
sized enterprises. Their marginal benefit from expanding their business across borders might
not outweigh their marginal costs because precisely of these compliance costs.
Another downside of the status quo is that Member States are often reluctant to allow relief for losses incurred by associated companies whose profits fall outside the scope of their

8

taxing rights.8 The current rules in Member States generally allow only for the offsetting of
losses of foreign permanent establishments but not for those of foreign subsidiaries.9 This
situation entails another risk of economic double taxation where losses cannot be absorbed
locally and provides a clear incentive in favour of domestic investment.
Lastly, one could argue that the existing differences in effective levels of taxation also
pose an impediment to the free movement of capital, a standpoint that the European Commission had taken for a long time. The theory of economic efficiency states that tax systems
should ideally be “neutral” in terms of economic choices, meaning that the choice of an investment, it’s financing or location should in principle not be driven by tax considerations.
Thus, to the extent that economic activity moves to particular locations for favourable tax
treatment instead of for productive investment opportunities, welfare costs are implied.10
From this perspective, similar investments should not face markedly different effective levels of taxation purely because of their country location.

8

Commission of the European Communities, supra footnote 3, page 39.

9

With the exception of Austria, Denmark, and Italy.
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Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves – A Citizen’s Guide to the Debate over Taxes, Third Edition, 2004, page 138.
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III.

The Reform Proposal of the European Commission
The EU Commission has sporadically tried to address some of these tax obstacles in the

past. Examples of its “targeted” legislative efforts are the so-called “Merger Directive” that
provides for the deferral of taxation on cross-border reorganizations, the “Parent-Subsidiary
Directive” that aims at eliminating double taxation on cross-border dividend payments between parent and subsidiary companies, and the “Arbitration Convention” that establishes a
dispute resolution procedure in the area of transfer pricing. However, these approaches have
been a mere piecemeal, apparently incapable of comprehensively solving the key problems
described above.11 I believe that the underlying reason for this shortfall in introducing a coherent policy on corporate taxation lays in the political structure of the European Union. The
EC Treaty empowers the Council to provide for the harmonisation of Member States' rules
namely in the area of indirect taxation, acknowledging that indirect taxes like the VAT may
create an immediate obstacle to the free movement of goods and the free supply of services
within the Internal Market. With regard to other taxes, however, the Council may only provide for the approximation of such laws or regulations as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market and it can only adopt rules by a unanimous decision of all
27 Member States. In addition, all EU rules in the field of direct taxation would have to
comply with the so-called “subsidiary principle”, meaning that EU legislation is only lawful

11

The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, for example, may abolish withholding taxes on dividend payments, but
applies solely to direct holdings of 25% or more. See Commission of the European Communities, supra footnote 3, for a brief description of more downsides of the Directives.
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when no action by individual Member States alone could provide an equally effective solution. Thus, any comprehensive reform of a direct tax such as the corporate tax is extremely
difficult to realise and needs mutual political consent.
Despite these predictable adversities, the Commission took a big step forward in 2001
and for the first time proposed a comprehensive solution for corporate taxation in the Internal Market. It presented a concept that allows multinational companies to operate a single
consolidated corporate tax base for their EU wide activities. EU enterprises with international subsidiaries shall be allowed to compute the income of the entire group according to
one single set of rules and to establish consolidated accounts for tax purposes. This concept
of consolidated reporting ignores the separate legal entity structure of subsidiaries once the
ownership of a parent company exceeds a certain threshold and combines the income of a
group of affiliated corporations into a single measure of taxable income. In a second step, the
consolidated tax base is divided among the Member States according to a commonly agreed
allocation mechanism. Since the proposal does not aim at harmonizing corporate tax rates in
European Union, each Member State would apply their national tax rate to its attributed
share of the tax base. The tax base shall be broad and simple, rather than narrow and complex, notwithstanding the Member States right to assign exceptions of the tax liability. Thus,
Member States' sovereignty to set and adjust corporate tax rates in their jurisdiction remains
untouched.
At first, the Commission presented little more than its general idea of adopting a common consolidated corporate tax base (“CCCTB”) and of some sort of apportionment
11

system. It took the CCCTB Working Group of the Commission another six years to publish
first details in a working document warily titled “possible elements of a technical outline”.12
This 2007 outline describes the basic structure of a possible CCCTB, presents features of the
tax base of individual companies and deals with issues of consolidation,13 whereas details of
a possible sharing mechanism are still missing. However, the Commission has recently confirmed its commitment to present a first official proposal for a Directive in 2008.14
I believe that such a Directive would indeed solve the majority of the identified tax obstacles to cross-border business activity in the Internal Market. The introduction of a single
consolidated tax base would not only significantly reduce the compliance costs European
MNE face today, but would also reduce tax-related investment distortions and would eliminate several tax shelters. Thus, the reform is likely to stimulate economically beneficial
cross-border operations, to generate efficiency gains and to increase government revenues in
the EU. Compliance costs would be reduced first because a multinational group would only
have to report one single income for all related entities in the Internal Market. The MNE

12

European Commission Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG):
Working Document: CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline, 2007, CCCTB/WP057/doc/en.
13

Thus, the Commission now seems to focus only on the creating of a common consolidated corporate tax
base. In the very beginning, there had also been a latent discussion of three other possible blueprints for achieving a single tax base in European Union - Home State Taxation, a European Union Company Tax and a Compulsory Harmonised Tax Base.
14

See Commission of the European Communities: Implementing the Community Programme for improved
growth and employment and the enhanced competitiveness of EU business: Further Progress during 2006 and
next steps towards a proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
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would only have to apply a single set of rules for computing its European income, thus facing for example the same depreciation time frames and depreciation rates in all Member
States. A consolidated tax base would also automatically allow the offset of losses in one EU
member state against profits made in another member state. This would eliminate today’s
risk that Member States refuse to set off a foreign company’s losses. Thereby, tax neutrality
between national and multinational groups of companies is enhanced and secured and the
risk of economical double taxation would be diminished. As a result of all of these features,
the reform would eliminate tax base competition for corporate headquarters and would significantly reduce tax-base related distortions with regard to the location of investment in the
European Union. Second and most important, by eliminating separate accounting the proposal would also abolish the need to establish arm’s length prices for transactions between
affiliates. The arm’s length principle becomes totally dispensable since it does not matter
which affiliate of the MNE does generate what part of the group’s income. Thus, all of the
described problems related to transfer pricing - including the risk of double taxation – would
basically disappear in the EU. It is therefore no surprise that important business interest
groups such as the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe strongly
support the proposal. An additional advantage from eliminating the need to establish somewhat artificial transfer prices is that opportunities for tax evasion and tax avoidance through
distorted transfer prices would be eliminated as well. If the EU decides to use a tax apportionment formula based on labor, property and/or sales, then there would be no tax incentive

13

to shift income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries anyways.15 Therefore, the costs
of administrating and enforcing the pricing process will vanish.
In my view, these gains from abolishing separate accounting (SA) under the arm’s length
principle in the European Union would outweigh the advantages of keeping it. Admittedly,
the international community has reached near consensus today to use this method for distributing multinational profits across countries. This broad acceptance provides a strong justification for the continued use of SA at the international level because reaching consensus is
essential to minimize the risk of double taxation. I also acknowledge several other downsides
of the Commission’s proposal of adopting a CCCTB with formulary apportionment (FA)
like the challenging task to provide a precise and practical definition of the “group”. Problems will as well arise with regard to aligning the system to non-EU countries. For example,
if a multinational company does not only have affiliates in several European countries, but
also in non-EU countries that apply SA, then the coexistence of SA and FA for this one enterprise generates (new) risks of double taxation and new possibilities for tax avoidance.16
These problems arising from the coexistence of both systems, however, would decline if
other countries follow the European Union’s example to adopt a system of FA. Avi-Yonah
and Clausing have made a good point arguing that a unilateral adoption of FA by the USA
would lead to a tremendous income shift by MNE into the U.S. which would in turn create a

15

More on the elements of a possible apportionment formula for European MNE below at IV.

16

To avoid repetition, please see my policy analysis paper # 5 on the reform of international taxation for a
more elaborate argumentation on the problems with coexisting systems of SA and FA.
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strong financial incentive for other countries to implement FA as well. The same argument
can be made with regard to the EU Commission’s proposal.
Since I believe that these conceptual flaws are likely to be offset by the overall gains in
efficiency and simplicity coming along with a European CCCTB, the proposal’s more dominant problem in my view seems to be political infeasibility. As I have indicated above, a
Directive implementing CCCTB in the EU would require the unanimous assent of all 27
Member States and I believe that this unanimity would be very difficult to obtain. Even
though the proposal does not infringe with the Member States’ right to set corporate tax rates,
it still harmonizes the rules for setting the corporate tax base and thus decreases national
autonomy in corporate taxation. A couple of Member States do not seem willing to voluntarily transfer this right to the EU legislator. Among the reasons of this reluctance might be the
fear that the EU Commission together with the European Court of Justice will use the Directive as a first step to further broaden their influence over matters of direct taxation – for example by suing Member States for national regulations that might impede the full efficacy
(“effect utile”) of a possible CCCTB Directive. Therefore, although the proposal is very
popular with European businesses, the required approval in the Council seems to be unlikely,
at least for the short term.
However, this does not necessarily have to put the implementation of a CCCTB in the
EU completely on hold. The Treaty of Nice highlighted the possibility for enhanced cooperation of some Member States where agreement by all States is not achievable. Thus, a “core
group” of Member States whose governments’ are willing to promote the concept
15

might take a lead and provide the consolidated tax base rules for MNE based in their countries with regard to the income generated by subsidiaries located in other participating coregroup-Member States. Naturally, the success of this approach would depend crucially on the
economic importance and influence of the participating countries. Another, more promising
way to proceed might be to make the harmonized tax base optional instead of compulsory.
The idea is that all companies to which the Directive generally applies should be enabled
either to opt for the CCCTB or to remain within the existing domestic rules where they are
maintained by Member States. Thus, all Member States must be able to provide CCCTB, but
do not have to impose it on MNE. The Commission has considered both the described alternatives, but seems to favour the latter one too.17
Admittedly, the co-existence of different tax regimes within one country could create
new opportunities for tax arbitrage. But the situation would be the same even if CCCTB was
compulsory for MNE, because the companies that do not operate internationally could still
be taxed based solely according to the domestic tax base rules. Imagine, for example, a
Member State A whose domestic tax base rules allow less generous deductions than the
CCCTB tax base. A company which does not yet have any foreign operations might then
find it profitable to start up a branch or subsidiary in another member state because this
would enable it to switch to the more liberal CCTB rules for taxation of its pre-existing do-

17

For a discussion of the first alternative way see Commission of the European Communities, supra footnote 2, page 17. Today’s commitment towards the latter “option”-alternative is reflected in European Commission Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, Working Document: CCCTB: possible elements of a technical outline, 2007, CCCTB/WP057/doc/en, page 6.
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mestic activities.18 The fact that under the original reform and an amended “optional approach” each national tax administration would have to deal with two different tax systems
could indeed offset some of the reduction in administration costs which would be gained by
abolishing the need for transfer pricing. However, these costs should have already been
budgeted for another reason – the implementation of the innovative, genuine European corporation form Societas Europae (“European Company”) four years ago. It was always clear
that the newly founded Societas Europae would need a genuine European tax base and the
CCCTB would finally fill this gap.
The last potential conceptual downside of the proposal that I want to address is the fact
that the Commission expressly does not aim at abolishing tax rate differentials among the
Member States - although many experts claim that tax harmonisation is urgently required to
avoid destructive tax competition in the EU.19 Those who favor tax rate harmonization believe that it is necessary to avoid corporate tax rate-competition among the Member States.
Tax rate-competition is considered to be undesirable because it is supposed to lead to what
economists call a “race to the bottom” in taxation of corporate income as countries compete
to reduce their tax rates to attract more foreign investment.20 Such a reduction in tax rates
allegedly could even have the potential of endangering Europe’s generous welfare states like

18

Example taken from Peter Birch Sørensen, Company Tax Reform in the European Union, 2003.
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On the need for tax rate harmonization see for example Peter Birch Sørensen, supra footnote 18.

20

See the explanation in Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves – A Citizen’s Guide to the Debate
over Taxes, Third Edition, 2004, at page 138.
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those that exist in Germany or France. However, even if we put aside the political infeasibility to agree on a uniform EU-wide corporate tax rate, I do not consider it a “failure” of the
proposal not to harmonize the tax rates. First of all, I do not agree with the underlying implication that tax competition among governments can be compared to competition among private-sector firms. Many economists believe that in an Internal Market with mostly unfettered
commercial relationships, the economic well-being of one country benefits other countries
without necessarily making people in the first country worse off. Second, evidence strongly
suggests that a race to the bottom, although it sounds inevitably in theory, is truly happening.
On the contrary, data presented by Baldwin21 shows that the average tax rate in the EU has
increased rather than decreased over a period of 30 years of increasing European integration
(1964-1994). Baldwin concludes from his data that the growing integration did not in any
way induce high-tax nations to reduce their corporate tax rates and he rather sees a “race to
the top” in the European Union. A sound explanation for this development might be that the
high-tax countries have such a big agglomeration advantage, for example lots of industry and
a sophisticated service sector, that the “periphery” and originally poorer countries could
never reduce their corporate tax rates so much as to induce firms to move. Thus, these countries do not try to compete head-on-head for the big player’s industry, but rather go for different economic niches and actually set their tax rates mainly with view of their domestic
concerns. And thirdly, one could even argue that a little tax competition among the Member

21

Richard E. Baldwin, Does tighter integration of goods and capital markets call for tax harmonization?
The
implications
of
two
competing
worldviews,
HEI
Genevy,
2004,
http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/tax_NZZ.pdf.
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States might actually be beneficial, inducing governments to provide services more efficiently to attract more capital.

IV.

An Apportionment System for the Internal Market
When assessing the major advantages and possible downsides of the second part of the

Commission’s proposal, one has to be aware of the fact that the key efficiency gains of the
reform are the ones described above. They arise from the introduction of a single consolidated tax base rather than from the system of distributing the so-computed income of the
group. Consolidation, however, necessitates the distribution of income through some estimate across tax jurisdictions and thus an apportionment system that complements the
CCCTB. Thus, the role of the apportioning mechanism in the reform is not to introduce additional arguments in favour of the proposal, but to provide a system that allows a reasonable
and fair distribution of taxable profits across taxing jurisdictions and that does neither reintroduce the problems that the reform tries to resolve in the first place nor provoke additional
opposition from the Member States. The latter is crucial since most European governments
used to be highly critical of formulary apportionment in the past22 and the Commission’s
strategy to implement it now is nothing short of a break from conventional tradition in EU
corporate taxation.

22

Many Member States had the impression that some U.S. states abused the system of formulary apportionment to extend their tax base beyond their natural jurisdiction by apportioning the worldwide income of
multinational groups doing business in the state. For a more detailed explanation of these resentments see Peter
Birch Sørensen, Company Tax Reform in the European Union, 2003, page 5.
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Using a formula to distribute a multinational enterprise’s profits across jurisdictions
might indeed be a new method for the European Union on the whole; it is however, not a
new method for distributing profits across sub-national borders. The U.S. states have used
formulary apportionment for more than half a century as the principal method to distribute
company profits across locations for taxation at the respective state level.23 They began using the system at the end of the 19th century for purposes of levying the property and capital
stock tax on the transcontinental railroad system. Instead of measuring the property value in
each state, companies generally measured their total property value including railroad track,
rolling stock, and franchise as a single unit and distributed the total across the states according to the value of the railway lines located in each state relative to the total value in all of
the states. When Wisconsin became the first state to introduce a corporate income tax in
1911, it chose to apply formulary apportionment using a formula based on the shares of
property, cost of manufacture and sales.
One can see from this example that every system of FA must specify the formula for allocating the tax base and rules for measuring the factors in the formula. However, the EU
Commission has so far failed to present any details of the possible sharing mechanism. Thus,
I will dedicate the remaining space of this paper to introduce some basic ideas about a possible apportioning formula. In my view, there are generally two approaches for allocating a
future common consolidated tax base to the Member States of the European Union. First,

23

Joann Martens Weiner, Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights
from the United States and Canada, European Commission Taxation Papers, Working paper n°8 March 2005.
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one could apportion the tax base according to the value-added tax base of the companies
involved. However, there are no current experiences from which one could draw conclusions
on the practical advantages and disadvantages of using a value added key as an apportioning
factor. A second possible method would be to use a FA system like the U.S. states. I believe
that the U.S. system can indeed serve as a model for a possible EU approach. Although the
political structure in the EU differs greatly from the structures in the United States, from a
plain business viewpoint, both economies are integrated markets and the U.S. use a tax system which is designed for an integrated market. When formulary apportionment was adopted
in the U.S., the proponents argued that the U.S. States already used the same accounting system and the same currency and that most big companies operated nationwide rather than
state-wide. The last two of these arguments hold true for the European Union as well, and
the first will soon also hold true because the Commission is currently working on harmonizing accounting standards in the Internal Market. Additionally, FA seems to be perceived as a
success in the US and some US-American scholars have currently proposed to even expand
the system to the national level.24
Nearly all states begin with federal income as the definition of the tax base and this practice leads to certain conformity among state tax bases.25 However, states vary in their formu-
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See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to adopt Formulary Appointment for
Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 85, June 2007.
25

Jack Mintz & Joann Martens Weiner, Exploring Formula Allocation for the European Union, 2001.
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las, definitions, use of the unitary business method, and administrative practices. Although in
the early days of formulary apportionment in the United States many formulae consisted of a
wide range of elements, a distribution key today usually only employs no more than three
factors: payroll, property and sales. Such a three-factor formula has gained wide approval in
the USA over the years because the combination of payroll, property, and sales appears to
reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated. According to Hellerstein26, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the economic justification for property and
payroll to be “clear enough” since income may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined. Income is in fact largely generated by capital and labor,
and the property and payroll factors reflect these essential income producing elements. The
sales factor, on the other hand, was originally designed to recognize the contribution of the
states in which a firm's products are marketed to the generation of the firm's income. When
one employs a destination test to assign sales of tangible personal property, then the sales
factor attributes income to states in which goods are consumed and serves as a counterbalance to the property and payroll factors that tend to attribute income to states in which goods
are produced.
Where these three factors are weighed equally, the formula is called “Massachusetts formula”. The majority of states today, however, double the weight of the sales factor in this
formula meaning that they weigh the sales factor by one-half and both the capital and payroll

26

Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: Allied-Signal and beyond, 48
Tax Law Review, 1993, pages 739-877.
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factors each by one fourth.27 This could be a good model for an EU formula because placing
a higher weight on the sales factor could increase Member States efforts to stipulate the respective economic activity by making it easier for foreign companies to market and sell their
products within its borders. One could even argue to use a formula based on sales only, like
Avi-Yonah and Clausing propose it for a worldwide FA.28 The main advantage of such a
sales-only-formula could be that sales are far less responsive to tax differences across markets than assets or employment. Also, even in a high-tax country, firms still have the incentive to sell as much of their products as possible. The incentive to distort the location of sales
among markets could be combated by defining “sales” according the destination principle
described above.29 However, since some U.S. analysts today see serious problems arising
from the fact that the States do not define “sales" identically,30 an EU Directive should make
sure to use a uniform and precise definition that does not leave any room for different interpretations by the Member States’ tax authorities.

27

Today, 14 states employ the “Massachusetts” formula and 23 states employ the double-sales-weight
formula. In 2004 the average weight on the property and payroll factors was just under 25 percent, each and
that the average weight on the gross receipts factor was just over 50 percent.
28

See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to adopt Formulary Appointment for
Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 85, June 2007, page 11.
29

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, supra footnote 28, page 29.
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See Charles E. McLure Jr., Understanding the Nuttiness of State Tax Policy: When States Have Both
Too Much Sovereignty and Not Enough, 58 National Tax Journal, September 2005, pages 565- 573.
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V.

Conclusion
The EU Commission’s proposal to switch from separate accounting to a consolidated

corporate tax base and formula apportionment should be welcomed because it is likely to
solve today’s most pestering corporate tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in the
Internal Market. Contrary to other scholars, I believe that a respective Directive has good
chances of acceptance by the EU Council as long as the adoption of the system would not be
strictly imposed on European MNE, but would rather be made optional. With regard to the
apportionment formula, I recommend to follow the U.S. states approach of using not more
than three apportioning factors and of putting a strong emphasis on a company’s sales.
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